and case law, the Amendment might be read as a mundane house keeping measure for federal courts. On its face, it just prohibits suits in federal court against a state by citizens of another state, or those of a foreign state. But the Amendment has not been read literally:6 today its reach extends to any suit in federal court for damage relief by any citizen against an unconsenting state, with only a limited opportunity for Congress to statutorily authorize such suits. And by analogy, the penumbra of the Amendment extends to lawsuits for damages based on violations of federal law against states in their own courts. These interpretations should be embarrassing to conservatives, since they are at war with the text of the Amendment, and draw little support from history or what we know of the intent of the framers and ratifiers of the Amendment. Yet many conservatives cheer on -or do not criticize -the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru dence, perhaps because it resonates with a pro-federalism policy agenda.7
One conservative who is embarrassed by the Eleventh Amend ment jurisprudence is Judge John Noonan,8 as revealed in his recent monograph, Narrowing the Nation's Power. Judge Noonan comes to the topic with impeccable scholarly and conservative credentials. A multidegree graduate of Harvard, he served on the law faculties of Notre Dame and Boalt Hall, published numerous books and articles on religion, ethics, and constitutional law, and was appointed to the Ninth Circuit by President Reagan in 1985.9 He is now on senior status in that court. Judge Noonan's sharp critique of the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence in general, and the Eleventh Amendment cases in particular, has drawn notice and praise in the mainstream media. 1 0 The Senate Judiciary Committee even held a hearing on the book. II 6. Bd. ofTrs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) ; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) . Yet given the enormous, and. mostly critical, scholarly commen tary12 on the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases, one must ask what Judge Noonan's book adds to the literature, which has been described as "not only voluminous but dazzling," and unsurpassed in its "insight, elegance, and sophistication ... by any similar body of work in all of constitutional law."13 This Review answers that question. Part I of the Review surveys the tone and substance of Judge Noonan's book. Part II discusses conservative legal opinions on the Eleventh Amendment. The first two parts are concerned mainly with a formalist critique of Eleventh Amendment doctrine, that is, analyzing the cases in light of precedent, history, and deductive logic. Drawing on arguments raised by Judge Noonan, the third and fourth Parts turn to a more pragmatic critique of those cases. Part III considers why the Rehnquist Court has seemingly decided so many cases raising Eleventh Amendment issues, and suggests that one of the reasons is the activism of state attorneys general in aggressively litigating the cases, as parties or amici curiae, in the Supreme Court. An empirical study on the states' amicus activity in Eleventh Amendment cases is presented there. Part IV revisits ad ditional rationales for, and empirical effects of, the Eleventh Amend ment cases. With regard to the former, I address whether current Eleventh Amendment doctrine has some functional justifications, whatever its doctrinal shortcomings. With regard to the latter, I revisit the claim of some that there are gaping exceptions to the doctrine that, taken with the purported availability of state-law remedies, considera bly ameliorate the supposed negative effects of the doctrine on the enforcement of federal law. The conclusion briefly outlines an alterna tive path the conservative Justices on the Court could have, and perhaps should have, taken in shaping Eleventh Amendment doctrine.
[hereinafter Hearing on Narrowing the Nation's Power] (transcript of hearing on file with author). Senator Schumer mentioned that the book came to his attention when he read Linda Greenhouse's review in the New York Times. Id. at 1. After praising the book, Senator Schumer added that the purpose of the hearing was to explore Judge Noonan's ideas on federalism and related issues. Id. at 8. Professor Hamilton had been invited, he observed, to "have a worthy co-witness who d . oesn't se e things q u ite the same way." Id.
12. Even a selective listing of the scores of law review articles would take up a lengthy footnote. For example, one recent compilation of the literature since 2000 alone listed twenty-five articles and three symposia. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1066-67 n.12 (5th ed.
2003) [hereinafter HART& WECHSLER].
13. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Ele venth Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 49 (1998) . For further discussion of the scholarship on point, see James E. Pfander, Once More Into the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship and the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (2000) . [Vol. 101:1463 I. JUDGE N OONAN ' S ARGUMENT In addition to being embarrassed, Judge Noonan is not coy about his position. In a helpful prologue marked by clear, jargon-free writing -as is the balance of the book -he observes that the Court's recent federalism cases are at "the center of an explosive package" of expanding state sovereign immunity, at the expense of Congressional power that results in a federal "right without a remedy" (p. 4). The Eleventh Amendment cases are "boldly innovative" (p. 9) because they have little connection, he says, to the text or original intent of the Amendment. The majority opinions themselves make little attempt, in his view, to justify a broad interpretation of the Amendment in light of precedent, logic, or practical difficulties of the state defendants.
As the title of the book reflects, Judge Noonan is concerned with the whole federalism jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. S. 549 (1995) . Lopez held that a federal law banning a firearm in a school zone went beyond Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. Elsewhere he had indicated that Lopez was correctly decided. Hearing on Narrowing the Nation's Power, supra note l 1, at 41. Principled distinctions can be drawn between cases involving the Commerce Clause and those involving the Eleventh Amendment, starting with the text and apparent Framers' intent of each clause. So one could be critical of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru dence while supportive of the Commerce Clause cases. That said, both lines of cases rely, in part, on deference to the record developed by Congress in passing statutes. And in both lines of cases, the majority of the Court has usually been nondeferential to congressional judg ments (as reflected in the record) as to the need for the legislation. 27. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
28. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) . [Vol. 101:1463 tive record that demonstrates that the remedy created (a private cause of action for damages against a state in federal court) is proportionate to the inj ury (state violation of a federal constitutional right embodied in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment). On three of four occasions the Court has found that abrogating legislation did not meet this level of scrutiny, and hence the legislation was found unconstitu tional.29 And equally if not more controversially, the maj ority of the Court in Alden v. Maine3° in 1999 held that the penumbra of the Eleventh Amendment did not permit Congress to statutorily authorize private suit for damages against unconsenting states in state court.
Judge Noonan tells this story at greater length, though much of it will be familiar to experts in the field. Still, he has useful insights and nuances to the story. For example, he discusses, and finds wanting, the purported Framer's intent cited by the Hans Court. Evidence that some of the Framers wished to preserve a broad understanding of sovereign immunity (and thus apparently contradicted by Chisholm v. Georgia) is best read, he says; as restricted to diversity jurisdiction, not federal-question jurisdiction, and as not limiting the power of Congress.31 Elsewhere, he notes the "illogic" of Ex parte Young32 - For the 2002 Term, the Court agreed to review two cases that raised Eleventh Amend ment challenges to provisions of federal law that authorized a private suit for damages against states in federal court. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003 , a six to three majority of the Court upheld the constitutionality of the private right of action found in the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Fitzpatrick, in my view, is still the high-water mark of the Court's expansion of exceptions, even after Hibbs. In the latter case, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist (the author of the majority opinions in Seminole Tribe and Garrett), the Court scrupulously adheres to the analytical framework of the post-Boerne cases. Bill see id. at 1986 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Garrett and Kimel "should counsel far more caution than the Court shows in holding [the FLMA provi sion) is somehow a congruent and proportional remedy to an identified pattern of discrimi nation.").
The Court also agreed to hear a challenge to Title II of the ADA. See Hason v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2002 , cert. granted 537 U.S. 1028 (U.S. Nov. 18, 2002) . At the request of the petitioner in the case, however, the Court dismissed certiorari. 123 S. Ct. 1779 Ct. (2003 . Reportedly, the California Attorney General withdrew the case with out having reached a settlement because the case -attacking a provision of the ADAturned out to be a political liability. Apparently it was the first time a case before the Court had been dismissed by a party, which had successfully obtained certiorari, in the absence of a settlement. See Charles Lane, On Second Th ought ... , WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2003 Apr. 11, , at A25. 30. 527 U.S. 706 (1999 39. There were calls in Congress to statutorily limit or overrule Young, but two years later Congress settled on a compromise of sorts, by passing legislation establishing three judge district courts. That statute (now codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000)) re quired that three federal judges (typically, two district judges and one circuit judge) convene to decide whether a request for conjunctive relief under Young should be granted. For dis- (Vol. 101:1463 twentieth century. Coherence, of course, may not be the only value, and perhaps one could live with an incoherent decision to ameliorate a badly decided one. So, in hindsight, it can be seen as a "masterful compromise."
On the other hand, Judge Noonan is less persuasive in suggesting that Young ought to be turned around. He suggests forward-looking injunctive relief could be prohibited, but retrospective damages relief could be permitted. This notion, though, seems wrong. It permits a state to continue in violation of constitutional norms, as long as it pays off past victims of the conduct. This would have permitted, for example, the states in school desegregation cases to continue to run segregated schools even after a federal court found them to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.40 In contrast, the current Young doctrine shields the state from accumulated damages, which might have occurred because the state thought, in good faith, that its actions were constitutional. It is also more consistent with the asserted concern of sovereign immunity to protect the fiscal integrity of states. Expenses associated with prospective relief can be budgeted contemporaneously with other expenses, while retrospective damages awarded on an ad hoc basis presumably cause more havoc for state fiscal planning.41 Correcting the state for the future while forgiving it for the past seems a better compromise (if compromise is necessary) than the other way around.42
·
In reviewing the more recent cases, Judge Noonan finds them unduly restrictive of congressional power and a "present danger to the exercise of democratic government" (p. 140). For example, he observes that Congress is in a better position than the Court to meas ure proportionality, and that the Court's insistence on a seemingly massive record of state violation of federal law ignores the fact that Congress does not irrationally rely on anecdotes in law making (pp. 146-48) . Ultimately, Judge Noonan argues for a "middle ground,"43 a term he employs but does not precisely define. We can infer, I think, that he prefers some literal interpretation of the Amendment, but can live with the status quo as it existed until Boerne: a broad interpreta tion of the Amendment, coupled with broad exceptions, including recognition of a robust congressional power (under Section Five if nothing else) to abrogate the immunity . 44 Another point Noonan does not entirely make clear is its intended audience. As noted, the book is useful but not especially revelatory to experts on federal courts. But that's a relatively small group, and Judge Noonan's helpful exposition of this area of law is probably most intended for academics and policymakers not steeped in the arcana of federal jurisdiction. The text, in a reader-friendly font, is only 156 pages, with 36 pages of endnotes, where he cites relevant portions of the considerable academic literature. Rather than relying on mundane narrative, Judge Noonan sets out large parts of his discussion as an exchange between a hypothetical federal judge and his law clerks. He also enlivens the discussion by telling us, though not at excessive length, about the parties and attorneys45 involved in the cases. His tone 1972 (2003) , in which the majority, in the course of upholding a challenged provision of the FMLA, carefully and at length examined the legislative record built up over several years in Congress, prior to the passage of the law in 1993. Id. at 1978-81 .
As an example of what he regards as the pernicious "impact of the Boerne criteria on the federal system," p. 100, Judge Noonan points out that not only the Supreme Court, but a three-judge Court of Appeals panel or a sole district judge, can "function as the censor of Congress," p. 100, by closely examining the record before Congress in these cases. I don't see how that point is related to his substantive criticism of the Boerne criteria. Under any standard of review, any Article III judge at any level of the federal system (and indeed state court judges) is empowered to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional.
45. P. 35 (mentioning counsel for both sides in Boerne); p. 62 (mentioning counsel in Chisholm v. Georgia). A quite different discussion of counsel appears in one of the recent articles sharply critical of the recent Eleventh Amendment cases. Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. C!N. L. REV. 367 (2002) . There, Professor Law, while discussing a federal district court deci sion upholding a state's Eleventh Amendment challenge to a portion of the Medicaid laws, points out that the judge sua sponte invited Ohio attorney Jeffrey Sutton to argue that issue. Id. at 393. Sutton, as Law tells us, successfully argued for the state in Garrett, is a member of the Federalist Society, and has been nominated to the Sixth Circuit by President Bush. Id. at 393-94. She does not state why these fa cts are relevant to her discussion of the issue at hand. As best as I can tell, she does not reveal counsels' identity or backgrounds in the other cases [Vol. 101:1463 throughout, almost without exception,46 is measured and objective, making it a model of academic discourse on the Eleventh Amend ment, or any other topic.
II. C ONSERVATIVES AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Judge Noonan's book gained attention in some quarters47 because the author was a presumed conservative criticizing the putative conservative federalism decisions of five members of the Court. The apparent apostasy of Judge Noonan was hard to ignore. But these characterizations beg the question of what is, or should be, a conser vative critique of the Eleventh Amendment.
Richard Fallon recently revisited this issue.48 He acknowledges that the " 'conservative' label is easier to apply than to define," and that "the relationship between a commitment to constitutional federalism and other conservative values is by no means always obvious. "49 Nonetheless, he sketches out several aspects of judicial federalism in this context. One dimension is substantive conservatism, which gener ally means disfavor of many civil-liberties and civil-rights claims, and suspicion of government regulation except when used to protect "traditional values and structures."50 Another dimension is methodo logical conservatism, which generally favors forms of originalism and textualism in interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions, coupled with respect for precedent and the desire to change precedent in only small, incremental steps.51 A final dimension is institutional conservatism, which often favors a strong presidency, is suspicious of 46. Admirably, Judge Noonan eschews efforts to engage in "psychobiography" of the Justices, and for the most part does not focus on or name particular Justices. P. 8. Nor does he discuss or speculate on the presumed policy or ideological agendas of the Justices. At one point, however, while discussing Kimel, involving the ADEA, he mentions in passing that almost all of the Justices are older, but are protected from job discrimination by their Article III status. P. 112. Of course that's true, but it does little to advance the discussion to mention the personal characteristics of the Justices. 54. As Fallon, and others, point out, the Hans opinion is not without ambiguities, and is arguably susceptible to a narrow reading that establishes a broad reach of state sovereign immunity as a matter of federal common law only, thus permitting it to be abrogated by any congressional power. Id. at 481-82. The Court majority has all but rejected that narrower reading. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 79-80 (2000) ; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996) . 55. Fallon, supra note 48, at 482. The charge that the majorities in the recent Eleventh Amendmen· t cases have eagerly overturned precedent seems overdrawn. While Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas, see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text, the latter case was only seven years old, and few have made the effort to defend the result in Union Gas. Cf Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 33, at 1032 n.328 (stating that Union Gas ". must stand as one of the Court's all-time most tortured and poorly reasoned opinions"). On the other hand, the dissenters frequently call for Hans and more recent cases (like Seminole Tribe) to be over ruled. E.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Fallon, supra note 48, at 443-44.
57. Here and elsewhere in this Review, I use the term "conservative" to mean scholars that, by my reading, generally take positions on federal-court issues that most would regard as examples of conservative legal thought. I agree with Fallon that crude ideological labels are difficult to define precisely, and should only be used with caution. To be sure, conservative writers have not cornered the market on abandoning preferred interpretational methodologies when it might appear, to the outside observer, to be convenient for policy reasons. Many liberal critics of the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases insist the cases are wrongly decided on originalist grounds. Yet they often argue against originalism when interpreting other provisions of the Constitution, and are not embarrassed by abandoning the constitu tional text in those situations.61
In his book, Judge Noonan does not label his critique as a "conser vative" one, and indeed it is difficult to force his analysis into the traditional categories of that ideology.62 He is conversant with 62. Perhaps this is reflective of his reputation as an unpredictable conservative on the bench. 2 ALMANAC, s11pra note 9, at 75.
Admirably, he also eschews the epithet of "activism" when discussing the cases, arguing that the term "should be banished from the political lexicon." P. 9. That term has degener ated from overuse in legal discourse and now signals little more than that the user disagrees with the decision. For an extensive and helpful discussion .of this point, see Young, supra note 52, at 1141-81. Nonetheless, to the extent the term "judicial activism" is a coherent con-methodological conservatism, as he is critical of the recent cases on originalist grounds (p. 9). On the other hand, he seemingly breaks with institutional conservatism by his frequent calls for more Court defer ence to Congress, particularly regarding that institution's Section Five powers. Thus, it seems an oversimplification at best to label, as has been done,63 Judge Noonan's book as a mainstream conservative critique. It simply doesn't fall neatly into either conservative or liberal camps. To my mind, that is a compliment, not an insult. Moreover, Judge Noonan addresses functionalist arguments for the results of the Eleventh Amendment cases, which adds to the literature and which I address below.
III. ACTIVISM BY S T ATE ATTORNEYS G ENERAL AND ELEVENTH

AMENDMENT L ITIGATION
Presumably, Judge Noonan would not have written Narrowing the Nation's Power if the Supreme Court had not decided an abundance of Eleventh Amendment cases. One of the critics of that jurispru dence, Larry Kramer, has lamented that the Court has decided "a seemingly neverending succession of cases defining, upholding, pro tecting, or extending the sovereign immunity of the states."64 Why the Court has undertaken to decide so many cases, and why it has been given the opportunity to do so, has been little discussed in the vast literature on the Eleventh Amendment.
Attempting to answer these questions has both demand and supply sides. The Supreme Court, through its discretionary certiorari jurisdic tion, controls the demand side. The Court's exercise of this discretion has attracted the attention of legal scholars and social scientists, as the Court rarely states why it has decided, or not decided, to review a par ticular case. Scholars have examined a variety of variables (such as the filing of amicus briefs, the presence of repeat players like the United States Government, or the ideological direction of the holding sought to be reviewed) to glean some systematic patterns.65 More recently, cept, Professor Young observes that Chisholm v. Georgia, championed by critics of the modem cases, "was considered an outrageous act of judicial activism in 1793." Id. at 1170. Moreover, he continues, "the most widely criticized aspect of the Court's federalism juris prudence -the state sovereign immunity cases -are clearly not activist in the sense of being a major break with the past. ... That does not mean that the Court's present cases are rightly decided." Id. at 1172 n.129. So far as I can tell, this literature has not focused on the Eleventh Amendment cases. And the Court itself has not provided much guidance (any more than it does in other cases), only blandly indicat ing on occasion that certiorari was granted to resolve a circuit split.67 Yet, it is striking that the Court has taken up these cases at a regular rate, when the docket shrank to about eighty-five cases per term in the early 1990s.68 On the other hand, as Judge Noonan noted,69 the Solici tor General often intervenes in these cases as litigant or amicus to defend the constitutionality of the statute. It is well documented that the presence of the United States in these capacities makes it more likely that the Court will review the case. 70. George & Solimine, supra note 65, at 189. But see Waxman, supra note 69, at 1120 (suggesting that Solicitor General's influence has been diminished in federalism cases due to the availability of private rights of action in which "counsel will press even weak cases to the next highest court," interest groups now plan litigation and thus diminish the uniqueness of the government strategically litigating cases, and statutes now subject to constitutional chal lenge were often "not carefully crafted and justified in the legislative record"); Suzanna Sherry, Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt, 6 GREEN BAG (2d ser.) 47 (2002) REV. 1069 REV. , 1083 REV. (2001 . Hamilton goes on to say that the "threat of making the politicians in those states appear as though they were opposed to the disabled was sufficient to move those politicians from a position of principle on behalf of their states to a position of silence." Id. 79. There are other aspects of state amicus activity in Eleventh Amendment cases that are beyond the scope of this Review. For example, one could further examine amicus activ ity in the lower federal courts or in state courts, amicus activity at the certiorari stage in the Supreme Court, or the content of the arguments presented in the amicus briefs.
As the Appendix indicates, there are also other interest groups appearing as amici in these cases who advance the interest of the states. Thus, much impact all of these briefs have on the Court's decisionmaking.82 Judge Noonan is aware of amicus activity, as he mentions in passing that advocacy groups for the disabled filed amicus briefs in favor of the ADA in Garrett (p. 116). He doesn't mention the briefs filed by the state in that case. More interesting for examining the activism of state attorneys general is Judge Noonan's reference to Morrison v. United States,83 where the majority of the Court struck down as uncon stitutional prov1s1ons of the Violence Against Women Act ("VA WA"). Echoing the observations of a dissent in that case -that thirty-six state attorneys general filed. an amicus brief in support of VA WA84 -Judge Noonan argues that the "irony of championing the autonomy of the state sovereigns when they did not appear to want it was palpable" (p. 135). But there is a further irony in giving weight to state attorneys general in Morrison, but not in the Eleventh Amend ment context. If state amicus activity should be given jurisprudential weight in federalism cases, it ought to do the same in sovereign immunity cases -the theory should be applied evenhandedly.
IV. PRAGMATISM AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Much of the Eleventh Amendment case law is highly formalist in its reasoning. For example, as Judge Noonan observes (p. 154), the Court has spoken of the states' "dignity" fostered by the Amend ment.85 Yet formalism has characterized much, though not all,86 academic writing on the topic as well. In particular, much of that writing has avoided serious discussion of the practical consequences of the decisions. One of the strengths of Judge Noonan's book is that he does expressly grapple with such pragmatic issues. (2003) (defending Eleventh Amendment cases as facilitating healthy competition be tween the federal and state governments); and Pfander, supra note 13, at 826-31 (discussing Eleventh Amendment scholarship that explicitly or implicitly considers functionalist issues).
[ Vol. 101:1463 Consider first practical rationales for the decisions. On some occa sions the Court has moved beyond formalism and advanced function alist justifications for the broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, for example, the Court has spoken of the need to protect the financial integrity of the states to enable them to provide goods and services to their citizens.87 Cognizant of the small body of academic literature discussing functionalist rationales,88 Judge Noonan finds the proposition unpersuasive. As he observes, the Court cites no empirical data for the fiscal integrity argument.89 Judge Noonan makes the provocative and convincing point that if the Amendment's shield was really necessary, one would expect to see states paying higher interest rates on bonds they issue. Since states, unlike political subdivi sions, cannot be sued in federal court if they default on bonds, the distinction should be reflected in the interest rate for such bonds. The bond market reflects no such difference: "A city, a county, a state agency, a state -they'll all give about the same return."90 87. Alden, 527 U.S. at 750; see also Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003 (rejecting Eleventh Amendment challenge to provision of FMLA creating pri vate right, in part, given that Congress placed limits on its scope, including various restric tions on damages awardable).
As has been observed, e.g .. Durchslag, supra note 86, at 604-05, some earlier Eleventh Amendment cases spoke in functionalist terms, at least in part, see, e.g. , Hutto v. 90. Pp. 56, 58; see also p. 59 ("As for [Eleventh Amendment] immunity, you could count on one hand the number of bond traders who've heard of it.").
No doubt the market considers a large number of factors in setting an interest rate for bonds issued by a state, as opposed to those issued by political subdivisions or others. For example, one factor that might suggest lower interest rates for state bonds is that most states are larger and have more taxing power than the typical political subdivision. Thus, the Elev enth Amendment bar to suit may only play the limited role of counteracting such market pressures. Since states cannot print their own money, "they operate in private credit markets just like private borrowers. These markets themselves, through the determination of credit ratings and other forms of monitoring fiscal performance, create an environment in which the fiscal authorities must behave in responsible ways." Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fis cal Fe deralism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11 20, ll39 (1999) (footnote omitted).
Perhaps Judge Noonan should have stopped there, for some of his other arguments are less compelling. Pointing out that sovereign immunity bars damage relief "for real injuries committed by a state," he asks "why should a state tortfeasor not pay compensation for the inj ury it inflicts?" (p. 154). The short answer is that a state is institu tionally different from other tortfeasors, such as private individuals or corporations. Governments do not easily respond to market incentives and, for example, may not .internalize costs in the same way as a pri vate firm. While we generally permit the market to govern the finan cial viability of private tortfeasors, bankruptcy is not a good option for a state. States provide a panoply of goods and services that may not be provided by the market, and face a variety of political obstacles not faced by private parties in order to raise revenue to pay for all of that (including money judgments). It does not necessarily follow that the state should never be treated like a private tortfeasor, but it suggests that limiting damage awards (as opposed to, say, injunctive relief) is not irrational.9 1
Judge Noonan also suggests that states do not "need an extra dollop of security" provided by the Eleventh Amendment since "fed eral law will be shaped by members of Congress not insensitive to the protection of their home states" (p. 56). This remark enters the debate on whether there are "political safeguards of federalism,"92 enforced by Congress with which the federal courts should not interfere. There is extensive academic debate over whether and to what extent such political safeguards exist and the implications for judicial protection of Vol. 101:1463 state prerogatives.93 An exhaustive review of that debate is unneces sary here. Suffice it to say that if one accepts some version of the political-safeguards argument, as Judge Noonan and some dissenters in the recent Eleventh Amendment cases appear to do,94 it follows that expansive interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment are inappro priate or at the very least Congress should enjoy wide power to statu torily abrogate the immunity. At least in the Eleventh Amendment arena, though, the predicate for that argument is at least debatable. For over two decades, it seems, Congress has frequently enacted statutes creating private causes of action against states for damages in federal court.95 More to the point, it seems difficult to conclude Congress has been engaged on the issue of state sovereign immunity, other than to pass laws abrogating it.96 LAW. 301 (1988) ; Meltzer, supra note 71, at 32; Pfander, supra note 13, at 826-27. In Alden v. Maine, the majority ob served that the Federal Employers Liability Act, passed in the early 1900s, apparently was the first law to subject states to private actions, but that such statutes "multiplied" in the 1960s and beyond. 527 U. S. 706, 744 (1999) . The Court added that the passage of such stat utes "in the last generation," id. , was "perhaps inspired by Parden and Union Gas," id. at 745. These two rulings found congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity. This sug gestion seems plausible but, to my knowledge, has not been addressed in depth in the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. See also infra note 110 (discussing similar theories about how Congress has legislated in light of Hans).
96. In the considerable literature on the political-safeguards model, there is relatively little direct discussion of Eleventh Amendment issues, so further empirical research on that point would be beneficial. For example, Evan Caminker has argued that the political safeguards model should include the possibility of private businesses joining states in lobby ing on sovereign immunity issues, since the federal Jaws in question typically regulate both public and private entities. Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 REV. , 1189 REV. n.261 (2001 . Consider next the effects of Eleventh Amendment cases. For some time majority opinions in these cases, even while holding that a private plaintiff was unable to pursue a damage claim in federal court, took pains to observe that at least in theory, the plaintiffs could pursue relief in state courts under federal or state law, or that federal rights could be enforced in other ways (e.g., through injunctive relief or in actions by the federal govemment).97 These observations, at one time thought to be of some doctrinal significance,98 are now probably little more than rhetorical flourish to ameliorate anticipated criticism of holdings.99 Of course, states can still consent to suit in their own courts. But how effective are the remedies voluntarily allowed by a state? No doubt the answer will vary from state to state and from topic to topic, but Judge Noonan is not sanguine.100 Though he doesn't discuss the point at length, his pessimism seems justified. For example, recent studies of the scope of state-law remedies for the age and disability discrimination involved in recent cases reveal that their substantive and procedural protections fall short of what is provided by federal law (i.e., the ADEA and the ADA certain circumstances, but often the procedures and remedies provided fall short of that in a normal civil action. 10 2 While on paper the situation might look bleak for a plaintiff seeking relief against a state, to my knowledge there is very little empirical work on how often such remedies are used, rates of settlement, or other factors which would inform a judgment on the true worth of these alternative remedies.
. As mentioned earlier, the Court has pointed to exceptions or alternatives to the bar of Eleventh Amendment immunity, notably enforcement actions by the federal government, private actions for injunctive relief, and private actions for damages against individual state officers. Judge Noonan acknowledges the exceptions (pp. 43-51) but doesn't seem impressed by their breadth. Someone who is im pressed is John Jeffries, who has famously argued that the "Eleventh Amendment almost never matters."103 For example, aside from the exceptions mentioned, Jeffries observes that almost all states, as a matter of law or policy, will defend and indemnify state officials in suits for damages.104 Thus, states are paying damage awards despite their Eleventh Amendment protection.
Yet none of these exceptions are panaceas. Absent significant expansion of the numbers and responsibilities of U.S. Attorneys, pub lic enforcement of federal law will not replace private actions.105 Injunctive relief might be limited by restrictions on the scope of Ex parte Yo ung.106 Damage actions against individual officers might be barred by qualified immunity in particular circumstances.107 As Judge Noonan recognizes (p. 142), the new frontier of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence will be Court review of statutes conditioning federal 102. Most states permit themselves to be sued in a court of claims or another specialized tribunal. They often limit the right to a jury trial or place ceilings on full compensation for damages, however. See Joanne C. Brant, The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 767, 801-03 (1998 110. In his discussion of Hans, Justice Scalia stated in part as follows:
Even if I were wrong, however, about the original meaning of the Constitution, or the as sumption adopted by the Eleventh Amendment, or the structural necessity for federal question suits against the States, it cannot possibly be denied that the question is at least close. In that situation, the mere venerability of an answer consistently adhered to for almost a century, and the difficulty of changing, or even clearly identifying, the intervening law that has been based on that answer, strongly argue against a change .... Moreover, unlike the vast majority of judicial decisions, Hans has had a pervasive effect upon statutory law, auto matically assuring that private damages actions created by federal law do not extend against the States .... It is impossible to say how many extant statutes would have included an ex plicit preclusion of suits against States if it had not been thought that such suits were auto matically barred .... I would therefore decline respondents' invitation to overrule Hans v. Louisiana.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Dan Meltzer is unpersuaded by this congressional-reliance argument. Since 1973 (in the Employees of the Department of Public Health, 411 U. S. 279, 284-85 (1973) , case), he says, Congress has had to deal with a plain-statement requirement in the Eleventh Amendment context, and in "that legal environment, it is chimerical to suppose that overruling Hans would suddenly subject the states to liability not fairly contemplated by Congress." Meltzer, supra note 71, at 32. He has a point, but it ignores congressional activity from 1890, when Hans was decided, to 1989. During that period, Scalia argues, Congress may have drafted legislation on the assumption that the Hans barrier prevented private enforcement for statutes would be subject to something more than perfunctory rational basis review, especially if a state presented compelling empirical evi dence that a private remedy for damages would indeed undermine its fiscal integrity. By constitutionalizing Hans and cutting off Congress's Article I powers, Seminole Tribe limits the scope of a middle ground. It makes it more difficult to struggle toward a middle ground. Even in the wake of that case, and without overruling later cases, a middle ground might encompass, say, more benign views of congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,1 1 5 or under the conditional spending power. Judge Noonan's provocative and engaging monograph should aid thoughtful and reflective people on all sides of the continuing and contentious Eleventh Amendment debate, but especially conservatives who, like him, would like to find some middle ground.
where. It follows that clear-statement canons in this instance can be justified as preference eliciting.
115. Cf P. 142 (suggesting that under Section Five, Congress could "do piecemeal what it had attempted to do wholesale"). Perhaps the Court's decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 Ct. (2003 , is a portend of a middle ground. One reaction to the decision described the Court as · engaging in "a surprising break with its march toward states' rights." Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Rule Workers Can Sue States Over Leave, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at Al. No doubt, this was not only due to the upholding of a high-profile federal statute against an Eleventh Amendment challenge, but because Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, and Justice O'Connor joined the majority, both of whom had been in the majorities in prior, post-Boerne Eleventh Amendment cases. Still, as I argue above, see supra note 29, the majority opinion is hardly revolutionary. It faithfully applies the framework of Seminole Tribe and its progeny, and distinguishes, and does not claim to limit, prior decisions. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976-77. On the other hand, it does arguably take a more nuanced view of the legislative record than did prior decisions, and the Court acknowledged the prophylactic nature of the remedy in the FMLA, as one that did not merely create a remedy for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1983. That said, a number of factors counsel in favor of a restrained interpretation of the decision. For example, the majority noted that state gender discrimina tion is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Four'teenth Amendment, thus making it "easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations. " Id. at 1974-75 . Also, the majority emphasized that the FMLA "affects only one aspect of the employment relationship," id. at 1975, and found "significant ... the many other limitations that Congress placed on the ... scope" of the FMLA damages remedy. Id. In short, the case seems best read as an incremental change of the current Eleventh Amendment regime, though one I think that Judge Noonan would welcome. 
